The privately informed seller of a company sends a value message to the uninformed potential buyer who then proposes a price for the company. Make-up is measured by how much the true value is overstated, Suspicion by how much the price oer diers from the value message.
Introduction
Unlike much of gender research in experimental economics, we do not focus on the usual dierences in risk, delay, inequity, ... aversion, but on overstating the value of what one wants to sell and on suspicion as revealed by not believing such value claims. Our experimental workhorse is a modication of the Acquiring-a-Company game (Samuelson and Bazerman, 1985) : after learning the value v ∈ (0, 1), the seller can send a value messagev =v(v) to the potential buyer who then proposes a price p = p(v), which the buyer can accept δ = δ(p, v) = 1, or not, δ = δ(p, v) = 0. The payo is δ(p − qv) for the seller and δ(v − p) for the buyer, where q ∈ (0, 1) is commonly known as well as that the buyer is risk-neutral and expecting v to be uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. According to these assumptions the buyer will oer either p = 0 for q > 1 2 and p = q for q < 1 2
. We are interested in howv − v,v − p and δ(p, v) depend on gender, gender constellation, and whether one can condition only on gender or also on eld of study (economics vs. non-economics). We expect women to make up more, largerv − v, to be more suspicious, larger v − p, and to trade more with female than with male partners.
The Experiment
Our experimental setting is one of bargaining whether to trade and, if so, at which price. In this sense, our study is in line with those on gender dierences in bargaining (Eckel and Grossman, 2001; Saad and Tripatl, 2001; Solnick, 2001; Riley and McGinn 2002; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Sutter et al. 2009; García-Gallego 2012) . However, we add new insights in gender research, by introducing make-up and suspicion.
We interpret make-up, i.e. statingv =v(v) > v, as cheating, in line with a related study (Mechtenberg, 2009 ) that also allows for cheap-talk lying. We interpret suspicion, i.e. stating p = p(v) <v, as underpricing. Moreover, we control not only for gender but also for gender constellation. We run three treatments diering in information only: in U (unknown), trading partners randomly matched in pairs are unaware of other's gender, which is known in treatment G (awareness of gender constellation); nally, in treatment E (embeddedness of gender constellation) the eld of study of both partners is added to information on gender.
After reading the instructions, participants had to answer a few control questions before the experiment. Actually, we report here only on the choice data of the rst phase of a more encompassing experiment with unannounced later rounds allowing for experience and learning eects (Di Cagno et al., mimeo).
Main Findings
Proceeding as in backward induction, we begin with acceptance decisions δ(p, v) by seller participants.
Observation 1 One mainly observes δ(p, v) = 1 for p ≥ qv and δ(p, v) = 0 for p < qv. There exist no gender (constellation) nor treatment eects in acceptance behavior of seller participants (see Table 1 ).
Since trade is always ecient due to (1 − q)v > 0, and avoiding a minor loss as a seller might imply a signicant gain of v − p for the buyer, these ndings question other-regarding concerns: at least for situations when own generosity would let the other gain whereas oneself suers a (minor) loss, there is no evidence of pro-social behavior according to our data (only 1.8% in our sample accepted the trade when p < qv).
Suspicion is confounded with the share one wants to gain of the surplus generated by trade. Thus even a buyer who believes in the truth ofv, i.e. expectsv(v) = v, may propose a price p <v. We do not claim to distinguish pure suspicion and underpricing to guarantee oneself a satisfactory share of the surplus but only maintain that more suspicion should increasev − p.
Observation 2 Male and female buyers do not dier in suspicion, i.e. we cannot reject thatv −p is homogeneously distributed for male and female buyer Note, however, the signicantly lower prices oered to male sellers in Treatment G (see Table 2 ). These could be explained by expecting that male sellers overstate more, contrary to our make-up hypothesis, or by discrimination of male sellers. Actually, Observation 3 suggests and supports the latter explanation.
We did not expect Observation 2 since evolutionary psychology scholars have observed that females should have evolved more skeptical, e.g. when trying to nd a partner to raise ospring (see Buss, 2005) . Observation 2 as such does not question this hypothesis since its eect may have been overcompensated by male buyer participants asking for a higher share of surplus for themselves than female participants in this role. This, however, suggests that male participants in the role of a seller also aim at higher shares of the surplus by making up more, i.e. by larger dierencesv − v than those for female seller participants. This can be clearly rejected.
Observation 3 Female sellers participants make up more than male seller participants, i.e.v − v is larger for female than for male participants in Treatment G (see Table 3 ). Notes: OLS regressions, Huber -White robust standard errors in parenthesis. In the experimental protocol, v, q ∈ (0, 100).
Signicance: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01 Observation 4 When female are in both roles there is more make-up (see Table 4 ).
We observe that not only female sellers make up more than male sellers, but they strengthen the make-up when matched with the same gender.
Conclusions
By a modication of the Acquiring-a-Company game, we studied in the lab how make-up, suspicion and acceptance depend on gender and gender constellations. We nd that female sellers make up more than males, and especially when matched with the same gender. However, we nd no gender nor gender constellations or treatment eects on suspicion and acceptance. This implies, in particular, that there is no evidence of pro-social behavior, not even in those situations when generosity would let the other to gain at expense of own minor loss. Notes: OLS regressions, Huber -White robust standard errors in parenthesis. In the experimental protocol, v, q ∈ (0, 100).
Signicance: * 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01
